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TRANSPARENCY IS THE 
PERFECT COVER-UP 
(IF THE SUN DOES NOT 
SHINE)
JAAP-HENK HOEPMAN1
Even though calls for transparency in a modern form go as far back as the early 
Age of Enlightenment (Annany & Crawford 2018), perhaps Louis Brandeis can be 
considered the father of ‘transparency theory’ because of this famous quote (Brandeis 
1914):
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants; electric light the most efficient policeman.
Indeed, transparency is commonly advocated as an important tool to counter the ill 
effects of automated, data driven, decision-making (Hildebrandt & Gutwirth 2008; 
Pasquale 2015). 
Now Brandeis never used the term ‘transparency’ itself, but if we read publicity as 
transparency, I cannot fail to wonder: what if the sun does not shine?.... What if we all 
lived in glass houses but there is no light to see inside? Wouldn’t that render transpar-
ency useless? Indeed, wouldn’t that turn transparency into a perfect cover-up, allowing 
organisations to hide in plain sight, pretending not to be engaged in any nefarious 
activities? 
Do many eyeballs make bugs shallow?
It is a common mantra in the open source community: ‘many eyeballs make bugs 
shallow’ (Raymond 2000). In fact, it is one of the main arguments why the source 
code of all software we develop should be open. By publishing the source code of 
the software, one allows public scrutiny of that code by other, independent, experts. 
Bugs (i.e. programming mistakes) will be found that would otherwise lay undetected 
in the source code forever. As a result, systems will become more reliable and more 
secure (Hoepman & Jacobs 2007). Moreover, fundamental design decisions can be 
challenged, possibly leading to improved designs. 
However…
The mantra assumes three things. First, that an unlimited number of eyeballs, i.e 
independent experts, is available to scrutinise the growing pool of open source 
projects. Second, that these experts have an interest or incentive to spend some of their 
(valuable) time on this. And third, that every open source project is equally likely to 
attract the attention of a sufficient number of experts. 
All three assumptions are unfounded.
The number of experts is severely limited. These experts may often be inclined to start 
their own open source project rather than contributing to someone else’s project. 
And many open source projects remain unnoticed. Only a few, high profile projects 
receive the eyeballs they need. Advocating transparency to balance data driven 
decision making, suffers from the same set of potential problems. Systems that make 
automated decisions are complex, and require considerable expertise to understand 
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them (an issue that we will return to further on). Even if all automated decision making 
by all organisations is done in a transparent way, there will always be only a limited 
number of experts that can scrutinise and challenge these decisions. Which decisions 
will actually be challenged depends on the incentives; again, we cannot be sure 
high-profile cases are likely to attract the attention they deserve. 
Transparency by itself is useless without agency
Let’s assume transparency works in the sense that ‘bugs’, i.e. improper data driven 
decisions, come to light and people want to act. Transparency by itself does not allow 
them to do so, however. The situation also requires agency, i.e. the ability to address 
and redress the problem. (Note that for exactly this reason a large class of open 
source software is in fact free, as in free speech. This allows anyone with the necessary 
technical capabilities to change the source code, fix whatever bug they find, and 
redistribute the solution.) 
In many cases you have no agency whatsoever. Computer says no, tells you why, but 
no matter how you try, you will not be able to successfully challenge that decision. 
(See Ken Roach’s excellent movie “I, Daniel Blake” for a compelling illustration of this 
point.) This is caused by several factors.
The first, most important one, is the lack of power. A single person, wronged by a 
decision of a large organisation, is but an itch that is easily scratched. Even if the case 
involves a larger, powerful, group of subjects that are collectively impacted by the 
decision, or if the case is taken over by a powerful consumer organisation or a fancy 
law firm, one would still need laws and regulations that create a (legal) basis on which 
the decision can be challenged. Finally, the process of appealing a decision may be so 
cumbersome that the effort to challenge the decision may thwart the benefit of doing 
so. Individuals easily get stuck into bureaucratic swamps. 
The ‘house of mirrors’ effect
A mirror is made of glass, but it is not transparent. A house of mirrors is a seemingly 
transparent maze where one easily gets lost. The same problem plagues transparency 
theory: a decision-maker may be transparent about the decision-making process, 
but the description may in effect be opaque, hard to understand, hard to access/find, 
and/or hard to compare with others. For example, many privacy policies are overly 
legalistic, making them unintelligible by the average user. They are often far to long 
too, requiring so much reading time that no one ever reads all privacy policies of all 
sites they visit (McDonald and Cranor 2008).
Even if the decision-maker honestly tries to be transparent about the decision-mak-
ing process and honestly aims to explain a particular decision to the subject of that 
decision, this explanation may still be too complex to understand. The explanation 
may use jargon, may depend on complex rules (if rule-based at all), and may depend 
on so many variables that data subjects will easily lose track. These properties of 
transparency may also be put into use disingenuously, to make the explanation 
unintelligible on purpose, while claiming to be transparent. One can observe a similar 
effect in the telecommunications market where mobile phone subscription plans are 
complex, and where different operators use incomparable tariff plans. As a result, 
ordinary users have a hard time figuring out which offer suits them best (and a whole 
market of comparison services was born, not only for the telecommunications market, 
but also for the health insurance market for example).
Being transparent is hard
It very much depends on the decision-making process whether it is easy to supply a 
proper explanation for every decision made. In classical rule based expert systems this 
is certainly possible (by disclosing the rules applied and the facts/data/propositions on 
which they were applied), but in modern machine learning settings this is much less 
clear (Burell 2016). In many cases the machine learning system constructs an internal 
representation ‘explaining’ the example cases presented to it during the learning 
phase. But this internal representation, the model of the type of cases the algorithm is 
supposed to be applied to, is not necessarily close to how humans understand these 
types of cases and the logic they apply to decide them. A complex vector of weighing 
factors that represent a neural network does nothing to explain the decision made with 
that neural network, at least not in how humans understand an ‘explanation’.
Challenging a decision is hard
Challenging a decision is hard. Even when given the explanation of the decision and 
the data underlying the decision, it may be hard to verify that the decision is valid. This 
is caused by several factors.
First of all, you need the necessary domain knowledge to understand the explanation, 
and to spot potential problems or inconsistencies in it. For example, to understand 
whether a decision in, say, environmental law is correct you need to be an expert in 
environmental law yourself. (This partially overlaps the first argument of the difficulty 
of finding and incentivising experts to challenge a decision.) Secondly, the validity of 
a decision depends both on the interpretation of the data on which it is based, and 
the interpretation of the rules used to arrive at the decision. Moreover, the selection 
of the rules matters a lot: it may very well be that applying a different set of rules 
would have led to an entirely different set of decisions. (And all this assumes that the 
decision-making is in fact rule based to begin with, allowing such a clear interpre-
tation.) Thirdly, the data set may be so large and the model used to ‘compute’ the 
decision so complex, that even a basic verification of the consistency of the decision 
itself (let alone any complex ‘what-if’ scenario analysis) cannot be done ‘by hand’ 
and thus requires access to sufficiently powerful data processing resources. In 
the worst case the problem is so complex that only the decision-maker itself has 
enough resources to perform such an analysis. This totally undermines the principle 
of independent oversight. Lastly, the explanation of the decision may be valid and 
reasonable, but may not be the actual reason for the decision. A common example 
is the (inadvertent) use of proxies (like home address or neighbourhood) for sensitive 
personal data categories like race or religion. Sometimes this happens on purpose, 
sometimes this is a mistake.
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Transparency may conflict with other legitimate interests
Even if the system used allows for the proper explanation of all decisions made, 
publishing these explanations may reveal too much information about the underlying 
model used to arrive at the decision. Of course, that is the whole point of requiring 
transparency. However, certain organisations may wish to keep their decision-making 
logic a secret, and may have a legitimate interest for this. For example, law enforce-
ment or intelligence agencies have every reason not to reveal the models they use to 
identify potential terrorists (for fear that terrorists will change their modus operandi to 
evade detection). Similar arguments apply to fraud detection algorithms for example. 
Business, like credit scoring agencies, may not want to reveal their models as these 
algorithms, these models, may be the only true asset, the crown jewels, of the company. 
Conclusion
We have discussed six arguments to show that transparency by itself is insufficient to 
counterbalance the ill effects of automated, data driven, decision making. This is not 
to say that transparency is useless. To the contrary: the mere fact that decision-makers 
are forced to be transparent will make them behave more diligently most of the time. 
But this is not enough. We need new, stronger, models of accountability that take the 
above limitations of transparency into account (Annany and Crawford 2018). For 
transparency to work, agency is a prerequisite. We need suitably incentivised experts 
that can help challenge decisions. Proper enforcement of transparency requirements 
is necessary, to ensure that the information provided is accessible and intelligible. 
Using decision-making processes that are hard to explain should be made illegal. 
And independent verification platforms that make it possible to verify and analyse 
decisions based on complex models and data sets must be made available. Finally, 
where transparency conflicts with other legitimate interests, a clear set of principles are 
necessary to decide when an explanation is not required. 
Because without sun, transparency is the perfect cover, hiding in plain sight what 
everyone fails to see.
Notes
1 This research is partially funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme 
under grant agreement no 732546 (DECODE) and by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific 
Research (NWO) as project ‘Patterns for Privacy’ (CYBSEC.14.030).
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